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In this paper, we use a conditional-convergence econometric model to in-
vestigate whether the Cohesion Policy and the structural funds this policy
mobilises, aﬀect the European economies in such a way that the poorer regions
catch up with the rich ones. In this model, regional convergence depends on
policy treatment and regional economic structure, proxied by investment per
capita and the demographic growth rate. The main originality of the model
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1is its speciﬁcation, dealing with temporal and spatial issues at the same time.
Econometric estimations rely on a dataset of 143 EU14-NUTS1/NUTS2 re-
gions observed over more than 25 years (from 1980 to 2005). Generalized
Method of Moment estimation enables us to obtain consistent estimates of
the beta-parameter along with estimates of the impact of regional policies
and regional economic structure on regional growth. Our results suggest that
Objective 1 programmes have a direct eﬀect on regional GDP p.c. growth
rates, whereas total structural funds do not. We interpret this result as
an Objective 1 programme added-value, compared to total structural funds.
However, these results do not mean that the non-Objective 1 structural funds
have no impact on overall growth in the EU (e.g. through a technology dif-
fusion eﬀect) but they do not allow additional growth speciﬁcally in these
regions, when we consider the spatial dependences. Moreover, consideration
of the spatial dimension of the panel brings to light a still signiﬁcant, but less
important, impact of structural funds on convergence.
Keywords: Dynamic panels, GMM, Regional Convergence, Spatial Depen-
dence, Structural Funds
JEL: C21, C23, O52, R11, R15
1 Introduction
European Cohesion Policy investments aim at improving the competitive position of
regional policies by encouraging regions to provide public goods, such as networks of
transport and energy, environmental quality, investments in education and research-
development. In other words, the Cohesion Policy fosters regional development by vari-
ous means, like competitiveness enhancement, infrastructure improvement, active labour
market facilities, innovation enhancement or sustainable development. The public goods
provided result from public and private expenditure. The policy seeks to add value
2beyond simple investments, with a multi-levels governance model to involve local and
regional actors in the design and delivery of the policy. This governance model enables
regions to activate the most appropriate drivers to foster their development, and to design
projects in a bottom-up approach.
The Cohesion Policy has relied on the same principles since 1988. The policy directs
funds towards a limited number of "objectives", with a focus on the least developed
regions; funding is based on multi-annual programming with ongoing analysis and eval-
uation; the design and implementation of the programmes involve regional, national and
EU actors, and additionality ensures that EU expenditure is not substituted for national
investment. The focus on the least developed regions concentrates funding on the Objec-
tive 1 regions, that represent about 25 % of the European population, and beneﬁt from
64 % of the allocated funds (for the last programme).
The policy was renewed for seven years in 2007. A debate has just been launched
with a view to continuous improvement of the policy, based on a public consultation
about the budget review and the territorial cohesion strategy (European Commission,
2008). At this stage, it is important to evaluate the impact of past Structural Funds (SF)
expenditure to assess whether structural policies are eﬀectively leading to a narrowing of
disparities of wealth between EU regions.
This paper evaluates the impact of SF on the convergence process between European
regions over the 1980-2005 period. This analysis raises two issues, a methodological issue
because we need to extend the neoclassical growth model towards impact analysis of the
Cohesion Policy, and an empirical one because the convergence is linked to spatial and
temporal phenomena that have to be assessed simultaneously.
Many of the analyses of the impact of structural funds on regional growth are based
on the neoclassical Solow growth model (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956). Roughly speaking,
this model predicts a convergence of income among regions having a similar economic
structure. Hence, the growth of capital-scarce regions is temporarily stimulated above
3the region’s usual steady-state growth level, when SF ﬁnance physical capital. The most
recent studies attempt to conciliate the standard convergence approach equation and the
classical spatial economy (New Economic Geography and Urban Economics). Despite a
recent growing literature on this topic, the results have been ambiguous, depending upon
the model speciﬁcation, the data used, the estimation strategy (see for recent surveys:
Arbia et al., 2008; Esposti and Bussoletti, 2008) as well as underlying models. Existing
studies on European regional growth have given varying results. In some cases ﬁndings
are conditioned by other development drivers than investment or population growth:
for instance, institutional quality of member states (Ederveen et al., 2006) or choice
in expenditure target (Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi, 2004). Moreover, literature results
stress that cross-section studies tend to overestimate the growth induced by the Cohesion
Policy because this approach can’t capture the unobserved heterogeneity among regions.
On the one hand, empirical studies using linear dynamic panel data models (Esposti and
Bussoleti, 2008) seem to correct for this issue, but ignore the spatial dependence. On the
other hand, the spatial cross-section analyses focus on the spatial eﬀects, but ignore the
temporal dynamic properties of the convergence process.
The main contribution of our study is to combine both dynamics: spatial and tempo-
ral. In this context, we use a new econometric approach based on the study of a Spatial
Dynamic Panel Data model (SDPD). Although its development is at an early stage, we
can estimate this model by using a Generalized Method-of-Moments (GMM) estimator.
In line with several studies using panel data in other contexts, this speciﬁcation provides
more information and data variability, thereby controlling for both unobserved hetero-
geneity and reducing problems with collinearity among our variables (two main related
problems in growth empirics).
Indeed, measuring a speed of convergence is not suﬃcient to analyse whether the SF
foster the development of lagging EU regions, and we have to design an appropriate
econometric approach to conduct such an impact analysis. It is not straightforward to
4identify the causal impact of public policy: the identiﬁcation would require observing
the outcome of a region in case of policy intervention and the potential outcome of
this same region without policy intervention. This issue, notable with non-experimental
data, is relevant to our study because allocation criteria of Objective 1 eligibility, and to
a lesser extent structural funds allocation, are highly correlated with regional income per
capita (European Commission, 2004). Moreover, we could expect severe misspeciﬁcation
when the spatial spillover eﬀects are not considered in the analysis. If the Cohesion
Policy aﬀects the growth process of a particular region, this change may also aﬀect the
growth rate of neighbouring regions. Indeed, the omission of the spatial spillover eﬀects
can produce biased estimates of Cohesion Policy impact. Lastly, the diversity of channels
through which the fund eﬀect could contribute to additional growth complicate the study
of these policy eﬀects over the long term.
We ﬁnd empirical evidence that the Cohesion Policy fosters the endogenous devel-
opment of Objective 1 regions in Europe. We interpret this result as an added-value
of Objective 1 programmes, compared to total structural funds. Finally, our approach
suggests that taking spatial dependence into account reduces the measured eﬀect of the
Cohesion Policy.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The ﬁrst section develops some
theoretical and empirical considerations on the impact analysis of structural funds on
convergence. Section 2 presents the econometric issues with regard to the spatial dynamic
panel model. Section 3 describes the data used for assessing the parameters. Section 4
presents the results and Section 5 concludes.
52 Theoretical and empirical considerations: impact analysis
of structural funds on convergence
2.1 Theoretical aspect of the convergence of European regions
From a theoretical perspective, three strands of literature provide insights into the eﬀects
of Cohesion Policy on European regional growth and convergence. The neoclassical
growth model is the most often cited in this context. However, endogenous growth models
seem to be more relevant because they focus on the mechanisms that allow public policies
to inﬂuence long-run growth. Finally, the economic geography literature sheds light on
the importance of spatial interdependencies and the eﬀects of geographical location.
The benchmark in growth theories is the neo-classical framework, which emphasizes
the role of capital accumulation. Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) models determine how
economic policy can increase the growth rate by inducing more saving or investment.
The main prediction of this type of model is the convergence of income among regions
with a similar economy. Actually, the logic of the convergence process is straightforward.
An economy converges towards a steady state as a result of decreasing marginal capital
product. When capital is scarce, it is very productive, so it receives a high return, in-
ducing economic agents to save more. Because of decreasing marginal capital product,
the capital growth rate depends on the distance between its initial stock and its steady
state value. In this steady state, regional income continues to grow, but this growth is
determined by exogenous factors (technological change, demographic growth rate, depre-
ciation rate...) mentioned below as structural characteristics. Indeed, regions with the
same structural characteristics (saving rate, labour force qualiﬁcation, and demographic
growth rate) necessarily converge towards similar steady states. The Cohesion Policy,
that ﬁnances physical capital, has two eﬀects: it aﬀects the convergence of an economy
towards its steady state and it induces structural changes which modify the steady state
income value of less developed areas. However, the way Cohesion Policy can induce this
6structural change is not endogenous in the Solow model. Hence, the Solow model explains
the development path for a given technology. Despite the extended Solow model proposed
by Bajo-Rubio (2000), public intervention plays no part in the dynamics described by
the model. Romer (1986), Barro (1990) and Lucas (1988) among others have proposed
a new framework to capture the main role of the technological path and the way public
policies can aﬀect this path. The Cohesion Policy can aﬀect regional long-term growth
rates by promoting labour force training (model based on human capital development,
Lucas 1988), increasing Research and Development (Romer, 1986) or, more generally,
public infrastructure investment (Barro, 1990). Thereby, public policies can be directly
considered as inputs in the production process or as factors to improve the "quality of
other inputs" (such as technology or human capital).
The two approaches above can be considered as non-spatial, because the development
of a given economy is considered separately from the other ones. The New Economic
Geography (NEG) and Krugman’s core-periphery models add a critical piece to the
regional governance puzzle by explaining the concentration of economic activities and the
productive advantages of spatial closeness. In this framework, two opposite directional
spatial processes may be at work. On one hand, centripetal forces (like economies of scale,
local innovation processes, transport costs or presence of demand for goods, among other
drivers) tend to promote geographical concentration of economic activities. On the other
hand, congestion costs (among others, real estate costs, wages and labour market costs,
transport costs) tend to counteract concentration of economic activities. We can note
the major role of transport costs which aﬀect these two forces. In light of NEG theories,
Cohesion Policy has an ambiguous impact on regional income convergence. As described
by Martin (1998, 1999), transport infrastructure investments (between regions) can lead
to an increase of spatial concentration by reducing these transport costs. However, public
policies that facilitate technological diﬀusion spillover can be beneﬁcial for less developed
regions. Moreover, Fuest and Huber (2006) show in a two-regions model, that a subsidy
7on investment in the poorer region unambiguously increases welfare if the labour markets
are competitive. If there is unemployment in both regions, the eﬀect of regional subsidies
is weaker.
Although all these contributions are important to consider, almost all empirical studies
investigating the impact of the Cohesion Policy are based on the neo-classical growth
framework. Moreover, as stated by Mohl and Hagen (2010), it is not possible to identify
the "correct" theory for the evaluation of Cohesion Policy. A spatial dynamic panel data
model can be considered as a good compromise to summarize the main contribution of
the three frameworks described above.
2.2 Empirical framework
2.2.1 Modelling b-convergence for spatial dynamic panel data
Firstly, we use the neo-classical framework as a benchmark. Following the speciﬁcation of
Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1992), several empirical studies rely on a b-convergence model
where the GDP per capita (hereafter GDP p.c.) growth depends not only on the initial
GDP level, but also on other conditioning variables (proxying the structural character-
istics of the steady state). Regions do not have the same structural characteristics and
thus converge towards diﬀerent steady state income levels. The further a region ﬁnds
itself far from its steady state, the faster its growth rate will be. In this case, convergence
is conditional: economies converge towards the same growth rate, and a gap may persist
in income level. This can be explained through the transitional dynamics of the GDP
p.c. ( ln yi;t):
ln yi;t   ln yi;t 1 =  ln yi;t 1(1   e t) + ln y?
i (1   e t) (1)
where ln yi;t 1 is the initial GDP p.c. for region i, ln y?
i is the steady state and  is the
rate of convergence.
8This model implies conditional convergence: for a given steady state, the growth rate is
higher for regions with low ln yi;t 1.
Accordingly, the following general estimation equation is in line with the empirical growth
































are respectively the gross domestic product and the investment





is the demographic growth rate. We introduce these last two
variables because they partially determine the growth rate in the steady state.
Using panel data improves the determination of ln y?
i growth rate by controlling for
unobserved heterogeneity across regions (Islam, 1995) through the introduction of indi-
vidual eﬀects and time eﬀects (respectively i and t). Therefore, 1 measures the GDP
convergence conditional to investment per capita and population growth rate.
In the underlying neoclassical growth model, economies are assumed to be indepen-
dent. However, several recent studies have emphasized that the closed economy assump-
tion might not be valid and that we need to take into account the possible interde-
pendence among countries or regions, which can be explained by spatial externalities.
Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that the productivity of technological spillovers
declines as the geographical distance between regions increases (Keller, 2002). Several
recent papers provide an empirical analysis of spatial eﬀects, spatial autocorrelation and
heterogeneity of the growth process to account for spatial dependence often detected in
cross-country growth regressions. In these spatial econometric speciﬁcations, the spa-






























+ i + t + "i;t (3)
The concept of conditional convergence refers to convergence after diﬀerences in the
steady states across diﬀerent economies have been controlled for. This is why recent
papers have developed a spatially-augmented Solow model which explicitly takes into
account technological interdependence between countries using spatial externalities on
total productivity (Ertur and Koch, 2007; Lopez-Bazo et al., 2004) and physical capital
accumulation (Ertur and Koch, 2007). Ertur and Koch (2007) argue that spatial auto-
correlation detected in empirical works must be explained at the theoretical level. Their
model includes both physical capital externalities and spatial externalities in knowledge,
implying spatial heterogeneity in the parameters of the production function leading to
a steady-state value for region with spatial externalities and global technological inter-
dependence. In the spatially augmented Solow models, a region’s speed of convergence
depends on its location so that we have to consider this eﬀect in corresponding economet-
ric speciﬁcations. To be able to assess the magnitude of this eﬀect, Egger and Pfaﬀermayr
(2006) suggest breaking the region’s speed of convergence down into its “classical” part,
and a remoteness eﬀect.
2.2.2 Impact of Cohesion Policy on European convergence
After having presented an empirical speciﬁcation without policy intervention, it needs
to be extended towards impact evaluation of the policy, including structural funds, to
assess the policy impact on conditional convergence.
10Direct eﬀect on regional development Empirical literature on the eﬀectiveness of
Cohesion Policy is most often based on the neo-classical growth framework. Firstly,
the work of Aschauer (1989), Gramlich (1994), tends to provide empirical evidence of
eﬀectiveness of public investment concentrated on infrastructure improvement as a direct
input of the production process. Hence, we can expect that structural funds directly aﬀect








































is structural funds spending in region i for the current period t.
However, structural funds can also induce a structural change in receiving areas. In
fact, regional distribution of public investment policy may increase the return of public
investment in receiving regions. Public infrastructure produced with the support of
structural funds may also aﬀect industrial location and enhance regional attractiveness.
Structural funds may generate positive beneﬁt in a region by increasing both public and





) and by leading to a higher steady-state income
value.
Is there an “added-value” Objective 1 programmes? Furthermore, we distinguish
Objective 1 programmes from the others. Firstly because this programme concentrates
most available funds on a few (less developed) regions. Here, we shall focus on assessing
whether Objective 1 group membership enables valorising projects dynamics that can
result in higher income levels (OECD, 2006). Initially, we introduce a Dummy variable
(OBJ1) in the previous equations specifying eligibility for Objective 1 program. Then,
we introduce a distinction between total structural funds (whichever programme) and
11funds allocated for the Objective 1 programmes. As recently shown by Becker et al.
(2010) using a quasi-randomized experimental method, Objective 1 status has a positive
eﬀect on the growth rate of the regions beneﬁting from this programme.
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3 Econometric issues
3.1 Estimation in dynamic panel
The dynamic panel-data speciﬁcation has become increasingly common in empirical
growth-convergence studies. As the inclusion of the time-lagged-dependent variable in
the equation might lead to inconsistent estimates, instrumental variable estimators are
required. A commonly employed procedure to estimate the parameters in dynamic panel
data with unobserved individual speciﬁc heterogeneity is to transform the model into
ﬁrst diﬀerences. Sequential moment conditions are then used where lagged levels of the
variables are instruments for the endogenous diﬀerences and the parameters estimated
by GMM (GMM-DIFF) (see Arellano and Bond, 1991; adopted by Caselli et al., 1996, (
in the growth context)). In the ﬁrst stage we eliminate individual eﬀects by taking ﬁrst
diﬀerences (GMM-DIFF) or a forward orthogonal deviation (as suggested by Arellano
and Bover, 1995). Assuming that the error terms "i;tare serially uncorrelated, the time
lag of the dependent variable in ﬁrst diﬀerences (yi;t 1) is instrumented with the levels
of the dependent variable yi;t starting with lag two yi;t 2 and earlier lagged levels.
12For small samples, the GMM-DIFF estimator may still yield biased coeﬃcients. Lagged
levels of the variables are weak instruments for the ﬁrst diﬀerences and the imprecision of
this estimator is greater as the individual eﬀects are signiﬁcant and as the variables are
persistent over time (Blundell and Bond, 1998). The system GMM (GMM-SYS) aug-
ments the GMM-DIFF by simultaneously estimating, in terms of diﬀerences and levels,
the two equations being distinctly instrumented (Arellano and Bover, 1995). However,
this estimator is valid under a strong assumption that implies no correlation between
ﬁxed eﬀects and the deviation of from the long run means (Blundell and Bond, 1998).
Eﬃciency relies on the “proper” choice of instruments, so the choice between the two
estimators (GMM-DIFF, GMM-SYS) is made using a common test of over-identiﬁcation
restrictions: the Diﬀerence-in Hansen test checks the validity of a subset of instruments.
As pointed out by Roodman (2009) a large number of instruments (due to increasing
time periods) can overﬁt endogenous variables and lead to an incorrect inference, so that
the Hansen test of instruments set must be carefully interpreted. This issue can also
aﬀect GMM-DIFF estimates: the bias resulting from too many instruments does not
result from their total number, but from the number of instruments for each equation
(Okui, 2009). These problems prove to be serious when T is too large for a given N.
In empirical applications, the instrument number can be restricted by collapsing the in-
struments (combining the instruments in subsets) in order to avoid redundancy between
diﬀerent time periods.
3.2 Estimation in spatial dynamic panel
Various convergence studies have found evidence for model misspeciﬁcations if the spa-
tial interdependencies of regional growth are ignored (Arbia et al., 2008). Within the
framework of regional analysis working on a dynamic panel speciﬁcation, Badinger et
al., (2004) applied a GMM estimator to spatially ﬁltered variables; Elhorst (2005) sug-
gested a maximum likelihood estimation of models that were dynamic both in space and
13time; and Piras and Arbia (2007) extended panel-data models with spatial error auto-
correlation to a convergence analysis of European (EU) regions. Spatial error model and
spatial lag model are two diﬀerent approaches to addressing the issue of spatial depen-
dence (Anselin, 2001). The ﬁrst is a nuisance form of spatial dependence and includes a
spatial autoregressive process in the error term. In the second speciﬁcation, often con-
sidered as a spatial autoregression model, interactions among regions are characterized
by a spatially lagged dependent variable. In line with recent literature (Beck et al., 2006,
Blonigen et al., 2007) this speciﬁcation would seem to be more appropriate to quantify
how the growth rate of a region is aﬀected by the growth rate in the surrounding re-
gions. According to Anselin (2001) and Abreu et al. (2005), the addition of a spatially
lagged dependent variable causes simultaneity and endogeneity problems and thus a can-
didate consistent estimator should lie between the OLS and Within estimates. There is
a relatively recent development in the literature on spatial dynamic panel data (SDPD).
Elhorst (2005) suggests an unconditional maximum likelihood estimator for an SDPD
model with either a spatial lag or a spatial error structure under a restrictive assumption
of no additional explanatory variables. Yu et al., (2008) and Lee and Yu (2010a) provide
the asymptotic properties of a quasi-maximum likelihood for an SDPD model with exoge-
nous explanatory variables. More recently, Korniotis (2010) proposed a solution based
on Hahn and Kuersteiner’s Corrected Bias Least Square Dummy Variable (2002) and in-
strumental methods (Anderson and Hsiao, 1982) extended to allow for the spatial eﬀect.
Moreover these various estimators may be complementary, depending on which speciﬁ-
cation is considered. For instance, Korniotis (2009) focuses on a “time-space recursive”
model whereas Yu and Lee (2009) work on a “time-space dynamic” speciﬁcation.
3.3 Extended moment conditions for spatial dynamic panel data
We consider that GMM estimators present several important advantages. First, GMM
enables each special case of the general speciﬁcation to be estimated with only a few
14modiﬁcations to moment restrictions. Furthermore, GMM allows the possible serial
correlation of additional variables to be considered by introducing diﬀerent moment re-
strictions on the explanatory variables. Let us consider the “time-space simultaneous”
speciﬁcation (as equation (2) above):
yi;t = yi;t 1 + 
X
j6=i
wij:yi;t + xi;t + (i + i;t) (6)
We restrict our attention to the stable case, i.e. with jj < 1;jj < 1;jj < 1.
We consider moment restrictions involving no correlation between ﬁrst-diﬀerenced er-
rors and earlier lagged levels of yi;t 1 (as described in section 2.1):
(i) E(yi;s"i;t) = 0 for s = 1;...;T   2 and t = 3;...;T .
Let xi;t be deﬁned as a vector of current and lagged values of additional explanatory
variables. Depending on what is assumed about the correlation between xi;t and the two
components of the error term, we can design diﬀerent moment conditions (Bond, 2002):
• if xi;t is strictly exogenous
(ii) E(xi;s"i;t) = 0 for s = 1;...;T and t = 3;...;T.
• if xi;t is weakly exogenous
(iii) E(xi;s"i;t) = 0 for s = 1;...;T   1 and t = 3;...;T.
• if xi;t is strictly endogenous
(iv) E(xi;s"i;t) = 0 for s = 1;...;T   2 and t = 3;...;T.
As previously mentioned, the spatial lag is strictly endogenous. Therefore, the moment
restrictions described above are not suﬃcient to provide an unbiased and consistent
estimation.
As mentioned in the previous section, structural funds commitments are strongly cor-
related with initial GDP, which implies an obvious endogeneity problem for this variable.
This correlation is mainly the result of the reform of the Cohesion Policy in 1988 (eligi-
15bility criteria, and allocation of funds based on national and regional characteristics such
as unemployment, GDP p.c., population density). Hence, we consider this variable as
endogenous, whatever the speciﬁcation and the selected moment condition sets. More-
over, we partly use regional European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) allocations
for the period 1980-89, that are not aﬀected by selection bias between the Objective 1
programmes and any other. In this context, we can use the reform of 1988 as an ex-
ogenous variation of structural funds allocation to estimate the Objective 1 programmes
added-value, compared to others1.
The choice of moment restrictions on other explanatory variables (investment per
capita and demographic growth rate) is less clear. Thus, our choice will be more prag-
matic (see section 4). As suggested by Bond (2002), we use a Hansen diﬀ test to dis-
criminate between diﬀerent moment restriction sets on these additional variables.
An obvious solution is to estimate (3) with further moment restrictions considering
P
j6=i wij:yi;t as an endogenous variable. This spatial lag means that spillovers spread
immediately, aﬀecting all spatial units. These additional moment restrictions are written
in the same way as (i):
(v) E(
P
j6=i wij:yi;s"i;t) = 0 for s = 1;...;T   2 and t = 3;...;T.
Spatially-weighted explanatory variables
P
j6=i wij:xi;t can be used to instrument the
spatial lag term. The exogenous part of the spatial lag variability is identiﬁed using a






j6=i wij:xi;t"i;t) = 0 for t = 3;...;T.
1The introduction of additional instruments, as distance to Bruxelles (as suggested in Dall’erba and
Le Gallo, 2008) doesn’t improve the precision of our estimation neither alter the signiﬁcance of our
estimates on the eﬀectiveness of Cohesion Policy. Hence, we do not report these results anymore.
164 EU structural funds and O1 regions
4.1 Data description
The analysed dataset has been designed according to econometric issues described in
Section 2. We use a panel dataset of 143 regions in 14 member states of EU-15 (see
Appendix A which describes the sets of regions included and excluded in the sample).
Owing to missing data, a small number of regions are excluded, among which several
are eligible on Objective 1 programmes (New German Lander, French overseas etc...).
We use NUTS2 data level for the main part of our sample, except for Germany and the
United Kingdom for which data on structural funds regional allocation are available at
NUTS1 level2. Finally, our dataset represents 90% of overall EU-15 regions and 80 % of
Objective1 regions. The 143 regions are observed over a period to 25 years (1980-2005).
Data variables related to equations (1) to (4) come from the Cambridge Economet-
rics database3. The gross domestic product (GDP) and investment (provided by Cam-
bridge Econometrics in 1995 constant euros) have been transformed into logarithms of










in order to consider the scale eﬀect. The demo-






For the estimation, we consider ﬁve aggregated time periods (1980-84, 1985-89, 1990-
94, 1995-99 and 2000-2005) to avoid short-run variations in GDP growth rates due to
business-cycle eﬀects. The accurate number of years required to avoid short-run varia-
tions is still discussed in the literature (see Temple, 1999, for an analysis). Temple (1999)
recommends 5 or 10 years long periods, but we preferred to follow the approach propo-
sed by Badinger (2004) and chose quinquennial time periods to collect information from
at least two periods before the beginning of the policy. The 1980-2005 period has been
2Nomenclature of Territorial Unit Statistics (NUTS) provides homogenisation of sub-national bound-
aries into the European Union. Although the level of decision reference for Cohesion Policy is the
NUTS2 level, some Member States use statistical NUTS 1 level for the simple reason that it corre-
sponds to a real administrative level in their own territorial organisation (e.g. Lander in Germany).
3The Cambridge Econometrics database is available at http://www.camecon.com
17split into 5 periods (1980-84, 1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-99 and 2000-05) that include three
diﬀerent policy programs (1989-93, 1994-99 and 2000-06). Thereby, we have a panel on
572 observations of 143 regions during 5 periods. Of course, the dynamic panel speciﬁ-






The variable measuring the regional allocation of structural funds comes from the 11th
annual report on the structural funds (1999). Data in this report are collected only in
NUTS1 level for Germany and the United Kingdom. For data before 1989, we use ERDF
allocation collected in the 14th annual report of the ERDF (1988). Finally, all variables
are expressed in 1995 euros.
4.2 Spatial weight matrix speciﬁcation
The spatial weight matrix is used to evaluate the covariance of characteristics across
regional locations. While a variety of weighting matrices may be constructed, in order to
allow spatial interaction, the empirical literature chooses weights based on arc distance or
contiguity between regions (Abreu et al., 2005). Thus, we have chosen a geographical de-
ﬁnition of neighbourhood based on arc distance between regions in order to deﬁne the W
matrix. More precisely we have chosen a k-nearest neighbours weight speciﬁcation,wij(k)
representing the element of matrix in row i and column j : 8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
w ij (k) = 0 if i = j
w ij (k) = 1 if dij  di(k)
w ij (k) = 0 if dij  di(k)
di(k) is the distance between the centroids of regions i and j, and di(k) is a cut-oﬀ
distance based on the distance of k-nearest neighbour for region i. The interactions are
assumed to be negligible above this distance. Although we have constructed W with
k=10, the results are similar with k=5, 15 and 20.
So, the matrix is row-standardised wij(k) =
wij(k) P
j wij(k) to provide easier interpretation
(each weight may be interpreted as the region’s share in the total spatial eﬀect of the
18sample) and to make parameter estimates more comparable.
k-nearest neighbours seems the best weight matrix to represent spatial interaction in
our sample : this speciﬁcation leads to each region having the same number of neigh-
bouring regions (k), including islands, in our sample, and to reducing the heterogeneity
problem of regional superﬁcies (Anselin, 2002).
4.3 Income dynamics in European regions
Table 1 depicts the dynamics of GDP p.c., investment per capita, demographic growth
rate and spatially lagged GDP for Objective 1 (O1) regions and other regions in Europe.
For every time period, O1 regions exhibit a GDP per capita far lower than the European
average. The diﬀerence between O1 and non-O1 regions increases from the 1980-84 period
to 1985-89 on, and then slowly decreases till today.
Figure 1 highlights the diﬀerence in GDP p.c. and growth rate between O1 regions and
Non-treated regions before and after the reform of the Cohesion Policy which introduced
Objective 1 programme eligibility. Although the GDP p. c. gap remains relatively stable
before and after the 1988 Cohesion Policy reform, one can see that the growth rates are
slightly diﬀerent and much more important for treated regions just before the reform
and at the end of the period considered, suggesting that the catch-up process is at work
within a conditional convergence framework. From 1995 to 2005 the regions’ growth rates
vary too much to conclude that regions seem to converge towards country-speciﬁc steady
state GDP levels, but the growth-rate gap is stable. This process is liable to spread out
ﬁrst among the neighbouring regions and then disseminate over the whole European
space. Observed spatial correlations highlight an obvious spatial dimension of regional
convergence (see Figure 2).
Figure 2 graphs the GDP-per-capita geographic pattern relative to the EU-14 average
GDP level for the 5 periods. The regions are split into 6 classes, from below 50 % of the
European average to more than 150 % of this average. For the ﬁrst period, regions with




Total sample mean (std) 9.44(0.40) 9.54(0.39) 9.63(0.39) 9.71(0.38) 9.81(0.37)
O1 regions mean (std) 9.01(0.32) 9.09(0.31) 9.18(0.28) 9.27(0.29) 9.41(0.29)




Total sample mean (std) 7.82(0.47) 7.95(0.44) 7.99(0.41) 8.08(0.37) 8.21(0.34)
O1 regions mean (std) 7.44(0.36) 7.54(0.33) 7.62(0.30) 7.73(0.27) 7.93(0.28)






Total sample mean (std) 9.46(0.34) 9.55(0.34) 9.64(0.34) 9.72(0.34) 9.84(0.32)
O1 regions mean (std) 9.10(0.33) 9.18(0.33) 9.26(0.31) 9.35(0.32) 9.48(0.30)




Total sample mean (std) 2.84(1.39) 3.37(1.19) 3.28(1.24) 3.29(1.30)
O1 regions mean (std) 3.01(1.45) 2.73(1.26) 3.12(1.37) 3.42(1.34)




Total sample mean (std) 3.34(1.59) 3.43(1.53) 4.87(1.05) 5.05(1.19) 5.29(1.35)
O1 regions mean (std) 5.07(0.87) 4.79(0.82) 6.16(0.64) 6.33(0.64) 6.83(0.49)
Other regions mean (std) 2.74(1.32) 2.69(1.29) 4.26(0.50) 4.55(0.95) 4.68(1.06)
Tab. 1: Descriptive Statistics
20Fig. 1: Annual versus Before/After intervention income and growth by treatment status
(authors’ calculation, Cambridge Econometrics database)
21Fig. 2: Geographic pattern of the GDP per capita relative to the EU-14 average GDP
level for the 5 periods (authors’ calculation, Cambridge Econometrics database,
adapted from Bouayad-Agha and Védrine, 2010)
income below 50% of the EU average can be found mainly in the southern periphery
and most of them are in Greece or Portugal. A small number (7) of these regions had
GDP p.c. below 50% of the EU average over the whole period. More precisely these are
in Spain (1), Greece (3) and Portugal (3). Except these particular regions, the GDP p.c.
spatial pattern between 1980-1984 and 2000-2005 is more dynamic in the periphery. Most
regions in Spain, Greece, Ireland or Portugal experienced growth rates above the average
EU-14 growth rate , while the most spectacular result is for Ireland, even if only two
regions are concerned.
225 Estimation results : impact analysis of structural funds on
regional convergence
The results are summarized in Tables 3 to 6. In keeping with the structure of Sec-
tion 2, we present the results of speciﬁcations for which the variables are successively
introduced. We start with the estimation of a neoclassical growth equation (Table 3) as
a benchmark speciﬁcation. Then, we introduce a spatial lag (Table 3) and the structu-
ral fund commitments directly in our estimations (Table 4), as previously carried out
by Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi (2004) in a static panel framework, and Dall’erba and
Le Gallo (2008) in a spatial cross-section analysis. Whatever the misspeciﬁcation, when
the spatial spillover eﬀects are not considered in the analysis, it is of interest to analyse
if consideration of the impact of structural funds slightly changes the results presented
previously. For that comparative purpose, Table 5 reports some estimation results of the
impact of structural funds in a simple dynamic panel data framework. Structural funds
may increase investment per capita leading to a higher steady-state income value. We
investigate how robust are the estimated results when omitting the investment variable
within a speciﬁcation that includes the structural funds, and we check if the latest eﬀect
is stronger (Table 6, Appendix B). As ignoring spatial dependencies in residuals leads to
potentially misleading estimates and incorrect statistical inference, we will ﬁrst analyse
the spatial properties of the residuals before presenting the estimation results and validity
tests. To the best of our knowledge, the spatial Lagrange multiplier (LM) tests have not
yet been extended to SDPD; therefore the speciﬁcations previously presented cannot be
tested directly. We check for spatial autocorrelation in the error term using the LM-test
in static panel data developed by Baltagi et al., (2003, 2007) and Baltagi and Liu (2008).
The results are summarized in Table 2. The result of the LM joint test for no spatial
autocorrelation and no random eﬀects tends to conﬁrm that at least one of these two
components is present in the error term (1369.03) with a p-value of 1%. The presence of
23LM test descripion Statistic p.value
Baltagi et al. (2003)
Joint test (H0: absence of spatial
autocorrelation and/or random eﬀects ) 1369.03 0.01
Conditional test of spatial autocorrelation
(H0: absence of spatial autocorrelation,
assuming random eﬀects are non null) 15.50 <0.01
Marginal test of spatial autocorrelation
(H0: absence of spatial autocorrelation) 14.28 <0.01
Marginal test of random eﬀects
(H0: absence of random eﬀects) 0.001 0.50
Baltagi et al. (2007)
Two dimension marginal test
(H0: absence of spatial
autocorrelation and serial correlation) 563.90 <0.01
Baltagi and Liu (2008)
Marginal test of spatial lag
(H0: absence of spatial lag) 47.38 <0.01
Table 2: LM tests for spatial dependence, random eﬀects and serial correlation
spatial correlation has been detected by a conditional LM test for spatial autocorrelation
given the presence of random regional eﬀects (15.50 with a p-value of less than 1%). The
simple LM test for a missing spatially lagged dependent variable is signiﬁcant (47.38).
The consistency of the GMM estimator relies on the validity of the lagged values of the
autoregressive and spatial autoregressive terms as instruments for the regression. Using an
orthogonality condition between the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced error terms and lagged values of the
dependent variables, we have to ensure, with speciﬁcation tests, that these assumptions
are justiﬁed. Firstly, the AR(2) test (Arellano and Bond, 1991) examines the absence
of second order serial correlation properties of the residuals in levels (null hypothesis).
24Failure to reject this hypothesis could supply evidence to validate moment restriction for
the autoregressive term. The p-values associated with this test (reported at the end of
each table) lend further support to our estimates as they fail to reject absence of second
order serial correlation. Secondly, the overall validity of the moment conditions is checked
by the Hansen test. However, too many instruments lead to inaccurate estimation of the
optimal weight matrix, biased standard errors and, therefore, incorrect inference in these
overidentiﬁcation tests.
In order to check the sensitivity of our results to the number of instruments, we present
alternative instrument sets. The ﬁrst one uses the full set of instruments available for
autoregressive terms and spatial autoregressive terms (full lag instruments). The second
restricts it to the nearest lags which can be used for each variable (second lag instruments
only). Finally the third collapses it (Roodman, 2009). Structural funds commitments are
always treated as endogenous, whatever instrument sets are used. In order to have signiﬁ-
cant lags to estimate the eﬀect of the ﬁrst programming period, we introduce the regional
ERDF allocation for the period 1980-89. The reform of 1988, which introduced the ob-
jective deﬁnition, and eligibility criteria, is used as an exogenous variation to estimate
the Objective 1 programmes value-added. Overall validity tests do not indicate problems
with instrument validity and orthogonality conditions used by ﬁrst-diﬀerenced GMM es-
timators for Table 4 and 5 (i.e. estimates with our key equation including structural funds
eﬀects on development). Table 3 reports weak identiﬁcation problems for the traditional
neo-classical convergence equation and its spatial extended version. Hence, the results of
these estimations need to be interpreted carefully. We did not use system-GMM because
the additional instruments of the level equation are not valid.
The regression results (Table 3) of the neo-classical convergence equation are mostly
consistent with the predictions obtained by previous studies (Caselli et al., 1996; Esposti
and Bussoletti, 2008). For the traditional convergence equation, the autoregressive term
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Tab. 3: Estimation of neo classical convergence equation and its spatially extended ver-
sion (eq(1) and (2))
26Pooled Ordinary Least Square (POLS) estimator is used. As expected, the coeﬃcient
estimated by GMM lies close to 0.85 and falls between the theoretical bounds provided
by LSDV and POLS (Caselli et al., 1996). Investment per capita (demographic growth
rate) has a signiﬁcant and positive (negative) eﬀect on regional development. These
results are consistent with the Solow model predictions (expected coeﬃcients sign).








of the (1 + 1) coeﬃcient (from 0.8 to 0.5), while the coeﬃcients associated with invest-
ment and demographic growth change very slightly (the last ﬁve columns of Table 3).
Within the SDPD speciﬁcation, we ﬁnd empirical evidence of conditional convergence of
European regions. Convergence (here net of spatial spillover) is faster when we consider
the impact of neighbouring income on regional development. This process is strongly
aﬀected by spatial dependence. In fact, the spatial lag coeﬃcient (0.4) suggests a strong
signiﬁcant impact of spatial spillover eﬀects between European regions in their dyna-
mics of development. The simple dynamic panel speciﬁcation that takes into account the
structural funds as an additional variable allows us to compare the results with previous
studies (Table 6). The structural funds seem to directly aﬀect regional development, but
not with the expected sign (negative signiﬁcant eﬀect). However, the eﬀect becomes po-
sitive for the structural funds allocated in Objective 1 programmes. The magnitude of
the eﬀect is comparatively important (0.05). This impact is in line with previous results
(Mohl and Hagen, 2010; Bussoletti and Esposti, 2008, in a non spatial dynamic panel
framework).
The direct eﬀect of structural funds on regional development is displayed in Table 4.
First, the eﬀect of total structural funds is not signiﬁcant. Furthermore that additional
variable does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the estimated parameter of the autoregressive term
(the coeﬃcient still remains around 0.5 within a very similar conﬁdence interval) and nei-







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Tab. 4: Estimation of SPDP with direct eﬀect of structural funds (eq(3) and (4))
28dummy variable which captures programme eligibility eﬀect is signiﬁcant4. The eligibility
for the Objective 1 programmes aﬀects the regional development of less-developed areas.
The eﬀect of structural funds allocated in Objective 1 programmes is signiﬁcantly posi-
tive (the last three columns in Table 4). These results are consistent with the evidence
provided by Mohl and Hagen (2010) in a short-medium term evaluation (1995-2006)
with annual data. The size of this coeﬃcient is smaller than in the non-spatial case (0.02
instead of 0.05). As mentioned in section 1.2, structural funds may generate a positive
beneﬁt in a region by increasing both public and private investment per capita and lea-
ding to a higher steady-state income value. We test the robustness of our results by
estimating equation (4) without investment per capita (Table 7, Appendix). This omis-
sion signiﬁcantly aﬀects the value of the autoregressive term which falls to around 0.25
and the value of the spatial lag coeﬃcient which increases from 0.37 (Table 4) to around
0.8. However, beyond the change in value of these coeﬃcients (due to the omission of
a key variable, investment per capita), the main results with regard to the impact of
structural funds are not aﬀected. Total structural fund commitments don’t signiﬁcantly
aﬀect European regional growth, whereas funds allocated in Objective 1 programmes do.
We can mention, however, that the coeﬃcient associated with Objective 1 funds rises
slightly following the omission of the investment per capita.
6 Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to empirically investigate the impact of Cohesion Policy on
European regional convergence. Using a dynamic panel dataset of 143 regions over the
period 1980-2005, including information from before application of the policy, we extend
the current literature by considering spatial dependencies and impact analysis together
within a spatial dynamic panel speciﬁcation. The broadness of our datasets enables such
4This eﬀect is also signiﬁcant in a speciﬁcation without the variable measuring the structural funds
allocated for Objective 1 program
29consideration.
Within the framework of a spatial dynamic panel speciﬁcation, we ﬁnd empirical evi-
dence that the Cohesion Policy fosters the endogenous development of Objective1 regions
in Europe. Moreover, our results conﬁrm that the Cohesion Policy, that aims at counter-
balancing the eﬀects of GDP concentration over the richest regions, attains this objective.
Our results suggest that Objective 1 programmes have a direct eﬀect on regional GDP
p.c. growth rates, whereas total structural funds do not. We interpret this result as an
Objective 1 programmes added-value, compared to total structural funds. However, these
results do not mean that the non-Objective 1 structural funds have no impact on overall
growth in the EU (e.g. through a technology diﬀusion eﬀect) but they do not allow addi-
tional growth speciﬁcally in these regions, when we consider the spatial dependences. This
framework could be extended to take into account the potential diﬀusion eﬀects implied
by a structural change induced by structural funds expenditure in the more advanced
regions.
Such insights conﬁrm that the bottom-up design of projects, along with the involvement
of regional, national and EU actors in the design, implementation and evaluation of the
programmes, has the capacity of fostering the endogenous development potential of the
lagging regions of Europe. As such, it may not be very important to concentrate on the
speciﬁc drivers in each region in an overall convergence analysis. But much remains to be
explored concerning this system of governance, both about its impact on the allocation
of structural funds and about its inﬂuence on policy eﬀectiveness.
Analysing the spatial dimension of the panel data, we ﬁnd that regional spillovers
do have an impact on regional development. The Cohesion Policy counterbalances the
negative eﬀect on regional development that occurs when the richest regions concentrate
income and activities on themselves. It is however our opinion that improving regional
spillovers can contribute to foster the endogenous development of regional clusters, as
has been demonstrated with Interregional Cooperation Programmes (Interreg). The last
30point stresses that the Cohesion Policy is implemented along with other EU policies
(like agricultural policies, industrial regulations) that can favour or hamper the eﬀects
of this policy. Extending our analysis towards national redistributive eﬀects, national
pensioning strategies and regional clustering can help to design more eﬃcient policies
toward regional development. Moreover, it would be interesting to use this type of model
(SDPD) to simulate the diﬀusion eﬀects due to structural policy in Europe. This study
may be considered a ﬁrst step in estimating the equation that determines steady state
income and in simulating the eﬀect of an increase of this steady state (as a shock due
to structural funds expenditure) on neighbouring outcomes. However, this proposition
requires taking into account the impact of this shock on regional and national behaviour
respectively (e.g. in public investment) in order to not rely on too restrictive assumptions
(such as the assumption that the shocks are proportional to the amount of funds allocated
to regions).
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Tab. 6: Estimation of Structural Funds direct eﬀect with a standard dynamic panel
39S-GMM-DIFF
Full lag Second lag Collapsed
instruments instruments only instruments
ln(
Yi;t 1














popi;t ) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)




popi;t ) 0.027* 0.029** 0.032**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations nb. 429 429 429
AR(2) 0.444 0.244 0.206
(AR(2) p.value) (0.657) (0.808) (0.837)
Hansen J 7.015 4.330 3.385
(Hansen J p.value) (0.535) (0.363) (0.496)
Hansen-Diﬀ J 12.05 14.15 5.65
(Hansen-Diﬀ J p.value) (0.210) (0.117) (0.227)
Instruments nb. 14 10 10
Tab. 7: Estimation of equation (4) without investment p.c.
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